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ABSTRACT
Our attitudes/beliefs typically develop gradually, with information
appearing over time. This study considered how 6- and 9-year-olds (N =
80) form beliefs from serial information, and how information order affects
this, in parallel social and physical judgment tasks. Children updated
their beliefs continuously, after each bit of information, or gave one
judgment at the end of the series. Updating results showed strong, short-
term recency effects; stable beliefs, reflecting all informers, developed as
well. These stable beliefs were weaker for younger children; the recency
was stronger. Both ages used a running average strategy when serially
updating judgments, but a memory-based approach when responding only
at the end. The latter produced no recency or age differences and led to
stronger beliefs. It is concluded that children use the same serial judgment
strategies as adults. Process parameters, e.g., recency weights, change with
development/information complexity, but even young children form serial
beliefs effectively.
Keywords
belief updating; belief revision; order effects; recency; children; attitude change;
judgment/decision; information integration.
RESUMEN
Nuestras actitudes/creencias típicamente se desarrollan gradualmente,
con información que aparece a través del tiempo. Este estudio considera
cómo niños de 6 y 9 años (N = 80) forman creencias a partir de
información en series, y cómo el orden de la información afecta esto en
tareas sociales paralelas y de juicios físicos. Los niños actualizaron sus
creencias continuamente después de cada bit de información, o emitieron
un juicio al final de las series. Los resultados actualizados mostraron
fuertes efectos a corto plazo de la demora en la respuesta; creencias
estables, reflejar a todos los informantes, y desarrollo también. Estas
creencias estables fueron más débiles en los niños más jóvenes, la demora
en la respuesta fue más fuerte. Ambas edades utilizaron una estrategia
promedio de huida cuando estaban actualizando los juicios en serie, y una
aproximación basada en memoria cuando respondían únicamente al final.
La última no produjo demora en las respuestas o diferencias por edad, y
generó creencias más fuertes. Se concluye que los niños utilizan las mismas
estrategias de juicios en serie que los adultos. Los parámetros del proceso,
e.g., los pesos en demora en las respuestas, cambiaron con la complejidad
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del desarrollo/información, pero incluso los niños más
jóvenes formaron efectivamente creencias en serie.
Palabras clave
actualización de creencias; revisión de creencias; efectos de orden;
demora en las respuestas; niños; cambio de actitud; juicio/decisión;
integración de la información.
Many beliefs or attitudes form and change
gradually, with relevant information appearing
bit by bit. This may hold even more for children
who cannot cope with as much information
simultaneously, yet is rarely investigated. This
study considers how young children form
judgments from successive informers.
There are large literatures on how adults
form beliefs from sequential information, both
work on attitude formation/change (e.g., Ajzen,
2005; Albarracín, Johnson, & Zanna, 2014;
Petty & Briñol, 2010) and on order effects
(Anderson, 1981; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992;
Hovland, 1957). These literatures differ in
emphasis, because attitude studies see order
effects as non-normative nuisance and eliminate
them experimentally – the effect of some
information should depend on content, not
whether it is processed first or second.
Nevertheless, order effects are pragmatically
important: They are ubiquitous, often large,
and appear in, for instance, persuasive
communication (Petty, Tormala, Hawkins,
& Wegener, 2001), responsibility attribution
(Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2012); category
induction (Duffy & Crawford, 2008), affective
evaluation (Zauberman, Diehl, & Ariely, 2006);
legal decision-making (Pennington & Hastie,
1992), auditing (Trotman & Wright, 2000), or
political candidate evaluation (McGraw, Lodge,
& Stroh, 1990).
Order effects are non-normative with
independent information, but, like other biases,
they might have heuristic value (Gigerenzer &
Brighton, 2009). Real world serial information
is often redundant, making it efficient to
settle on an opinion quickly. This yields
primacy effects, stronger contributions of initial
information. Nevertheless, the world could
change. Recency effects, stronger contributions
of current information, can then overcome the
initial opinion. Primacy/recency together may
filter information in a system geared to processing
over time (Schlottmann & Anderson, 2007;
Wang, Zhang, & Johnson, 2000, 2006). While
the adaptive function of primacy/recency has
hardly been explored, the view suggests that
order effects are integral to serial processing and
that both of them should be studied together.
This is done here.
Few studies consider either topic with
children. The basic ability to update a
representation from serial information is fragile,
but children adjust their representation of a
previously seen object, when told about a
changed property, by the end of the second
year (Ganea, Shutts, Spelke, & DeLoache, 2007;
Ganea & Harris, 2013). It is reasonable to think
that by early school age children cope with more
complex updating tasks.
Here we consider children’s ability to infer
an underlying, unseen property (e.g., niceness
of a person) and update this representation
repeatedly, from evidence items presented one at
a time. When such integration of non-perceptual
knowledge with current perceptual evidence is
required, one naturally assumes that the here-
and-now is more salient to children, similar to
the well-documented recency in children’s recall
(e.g., Jarrold et al., 2015). Children are not
caught in the perpetual present, of course, as they
clearly learn, but it is unusual and noteworthy if
prior knowledge is strong enough to determine
judgment (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986; Keil,
1989; Schlottmann, 1999; Chan & Tardif, 2013;
Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2014).
If prior knowledge is weak, in contrast, recency
can make interpretation difficult. Accordingly,
many studies neutralize order effects through
randomization/counterbalancing, or avoid them
with simultaneous information displays. In
causal/scientific reasoning or judgment-decision-
making, for instance, prior hypotheses are
evaluated in light of new observations and in
real life this is a multi-step process, unfolding
over time, but child studies often summarize
data in tables or visual patterns (e.g., Schäuble,
1990; Kuhn, 2010). Children’s personality/social
judgments benefit from multiple inputs (e.g.,
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Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Boseovski, Chiu, &
Marcovitch, 2013; Cain, Heyman, & Walker,
1997), but that these often appear in succession
remains un-studied. Similarly, many studies show
that when selecting trustworthy informants,
children are finely attuned to subtle cues
to credibility (Harris, 2012), but only one
considers how trust changes over multiple
episodes (Ronfard & Lane, 2018). How children
process serial information affects judgment in
many areas, but little is known about this.
This study focuses on both the serial process
and how information order impacts it, studying
how children form impressions of people and
of a physical property, from brief information
sequences.
Serial information does not imply that beliefs
are updated whenever new information appears:
We could encode each individual item into
memory and form an overall opinion only
when a relevant question is asked, based on
what is recalled. Hastie and Park’s classic
paper (1986) distinguished such offline, memory-
based judgment from online, spontaneously
updated judgment, arguing that the later
predominates in everyday life. Purely memory-
based judgment appears mainly when the
question is unfamiliar and unanticipated, a
view endorsed by many (e.g., Albarracín et
al., 2014; Mackie & Asunción, 1990; Bizer,
Tormala, Rucker, & Petty, 2006; Uleman, Adil
Saribay, & González, 2008). It is hard, for
instance, to avoid forming an overall impression
of a new acquaintance, even from minimal
evidence, and this is updated automatically
when new information appears, without need
for a question. When sampling from a bag of
sweets, in contrast, we may accumulate data,
but form an opinion on the frequency of lemon
sherbets only when a lemon lover asks. Memory-
based and serial processing also co-occur: Our
view of climate change probably did not form
continuously from initial data years ago. More
likely, we encoded evidence without reference
to this until the concept became topical;
only then was relevant knowledge integrated.
Subsequent evidence/questions, however, may
trigger updating of this overall view. Hogarth
and Einhorn’s (1992) influential review of social
cognition and decision-making also concluded
that updating is more frequent, as people often
use it implicitly even when only an end-of-series
response is demanded. Such continuous updating
is efficient, reducing processing and memory
demands, with individual memories not retained
(Anderson, 1981, 1996; Busemeyer, 1991).
The present study is the first to look at both
serial modes with children, contrasting how they
update beliefs online with how they form beliefs
when asked for a judgment only once, at the
end of the sequence. While serial information
is ubiquitous in their life, the precise conditions
of judgment from such information vary widely,
and we need to learn how these affect children.
From the adult literature, one expects recency
when beliefs are updated serially, while this is rare
with final responding (Anderson, 1981; Hogarth
& Einhorn, 1992).
This prediction from work with adults
may contrast with the developmentalists’
first intuition, because a simple explanation
for recency is that children forget earlier
information. For adults, however, the relation of
judgment and recall is complex. They correlate
if online serial processing is prevented (Hastie &
Park, 1986; Mackie & Asunción, 1990; Tormala
& Petty, 2001) but are often independent
without such constraint (Albarracín et al., 2014;
Anderson, 1996; Bizer et al., 2006). If children’s
judgment is directly determined by memory,
we should see similar order effects whether
judgments are serially updated or only a single
end-of-sequence judgment is made. If the two
serial modes differ from childhood, in contrast,
order effects may differ.
A model of belief revision that represents
order effects
To separate information content from order
effects, we use a classic additive judgment
model (Anderson, 1981, 1996). This has
been incorporated into more complex modeling
approaches (e.g., Busemeyer, 1991; Hogarth
& Einhorn, 1992; Kashima & Kerekes, 1994;
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Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004; Denrell,
2005), but the basic model and its behavioural
test suffice here. The model describes the
integration of prior belief with evidence, similar
to Bayesian approaches. The serial additive
model is mathematically simpler, however, and
preferred for now because normative Bayesian
models do not include order effects.
Under the serial integration model, different
bits of information (henceforth informers)
combine to a judgment as a weighted sum:
[Equation 1]
The informers at each position have an
information value, ψn, and importance weight,
wn (w0ψ0 is for the opinion prior to the first
informer). These weights can represent order
effects, e.g., recency involves higher weights for
recent informers. This model fits adult serial data
in many domains (Anderson, 1981, 1996). Here,
we apply it with children.
Model tests are not the ultimate goal, however.
Rather, if the model fits, one can use it to
decompose the judgments and measure primacy/
recency weights. In updating designs, these
can even be traced temporally. This approach
provided seminal evidence that recency in adults’
judgment is often short-term, with stable, long-
term attitudes developing as well (Anderson &
Farkas, 1973; Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979).
Counterbalancing, to eliminate order effects, is
valid because it neutralizes components that
often demonstrably have little lasting influence.
With children, this remains to be seen.
Equation 1 is general enough to accommodate
both continuous belief updating and belief
formation at the end of a series. The memory-
based approach involves one complex integration
of all informers, directly mapping onto Equation
1. Belief updating involves successive two-term
integrations, with the model rewritten into a
more specific, recursive form; the belief after
n informers then reflects an integration of the
belief prior to the nth informer and this informer
(Anderson, 1996):
[Equation 2]
A desirable feature of this belief adjustment
version of the model is that it predicts consistency
effects, common in attitude research (e.g.,
Gawronski & Strack, 2012; McGuire, 1985):
Consistent informers have decreasing effects, but
if a second informer is inconsistent, its effect is
large, e.g., if one knows a nice person, learning
another nice detail changes the overall view
less than learning of something unkind. Such
consistency effects arise naturally, without any
special parameter, because the weights sum to
1, making this an averaging model. Equation 3
rearranges Equation 2 to show this. The weight,
wn, still only depends on serial position, but the
response adjustment from position n-1 to n varies
with the distance/consistency between current
informer, ψn, and previous opinion:
[Equation 3]
Children’s behaviour fits the model, showing
effects of all informers, plus recency and
consistency effects -- if given help to consider the
prior opinion (Schlottmann & Anderson, 1995).
Here we study how children behave under more
naturalistic conditions of judgment.
Serial updating in children
The present study considers two judgment
domains, both extensively studied with adults,
person impression formation, and non-social
judgment of a physical proportion. Person and
quantity judgments are as important for children
as adults and here are studied together because,
despite differences in content, they can have
similar structure. Nevertheless, Schlottmann and
Anderson (1995; S&A henceforth) found much
more recency in social than physical judgment.
We follow up on this, adapting S&A’s method.
S&A implemented person judgment in a
Christmas setting: Participants helped Santa
judge the niceness of story children from
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sequential evidence. Santa had a series of file
cards for each child, one per month, which
participants inspected one after the other to learn
whether a story child had been “nice”(+) or
“naughty”(-), represented visually on the card
by different colours. Participants updated their
judgment of how nice the story child had been all
year on a sliding scale after each sample.
S&A’s binary evidence items involved
simple, repetitive stimuli, when in real life
information sequences may consist of varied
verbal descriptions or observations of different
behaviours. However, the serial model holds,
with adults, for materials ranging from
informationally simple to complex, for sequences
of balls of two colours, over series of
different adjectives or sentences, to series of
paragraphs in connected narrative (reviewed
in Anderson, 1996). Child studies first aim
to establish competence, so materials with
minimal interpretative difficulty are appropriate.
Moreover, the nice/naughty, +/- simplification
is natural for children, who often use/ask for
dichotomous labels of people and behaviours
(e.g., Giles & Heyman, 2005). The present
study thus keeps to the simple evidence format,
focusing for now on whether the model may hold
under a wider range of conditions.
To allow model analysis, S&A (and the present
study as well) used a factorial design involving
multiple sequences of such dichotomous +/-
samples: With 4 item series, there are 16 possible
permutations (++++, +++-, ++-+, ++--,
etc., to ----), corresponding to a position-1 x
position-2 x position-3 x position-4 design, with
+/- as the levels of each factor (Anderson, 1981).
This design maps the additive model of Equation
1 directly onto the additive ANOVA model.
If children consider all 4 samples, the model
predicts main effects of all samples on judgment
at position 4, but no interactions between them.
Equivalent additivity tests apply to judgment at
earlier positions in updating tasks. In S&A, the
model held for 5- to 9-year-olds. In addition,
strong recency and consistency effects appeared
for younger children.
The S&A study was promising but left
important issues open. In particular, it did not
elicit naturalistic serial judgments, having the
prior belief, and a recursive dependence of
responses, built into the procedure, with children
adjusting a sliding marker after each sample.
Accordingly, we know that 5-year-olds update
prior beliefs from current evidence in a mature
way, if the prior belief is perceptually available
alongside new data. But in everyday life, the
prior belief typically comes from memory. A main
purpose here is to consider how children update
beliefs under a more realistic procedure, requiring
purely mental representation of prior beliefs. This
may lead to less systematic judgments and/or
more reliance on currently visible evidence than
in S&A. It is an open question whether children’s
judgments will obey the serial model under such
more demanding conditions.
A second open issue is the course of
development. S&A found decreased recency
from 5 to 9 years, but this was difficult to
interpret: Younger children used the belief
updating, running average strategy of Equation
3 that is established for adults. Older children,
however, used an idiosyncratic strategy never
seen before, possibly a task-specific adaptation
to the slider. We assess here whether older
children still show unusual judgments when this
is eliminated and the standard adult procedure --
without a marker of the prior belief – is used.
A third question is whether order effects
differ between judgment domains. The Christmas
scenario just described provides a meaningful,
familiar social setting in which visual records
of behaviour are kept and inspected, allowing
a match to non-social judgment of the same
physical cues. In S&A, this non-social task
involved a judgment of colour proportion.
Recency effects were smaller in this task, but
the evidence was also clearly less complex
than in the Christmas task, in which the
colour represented behaviour. This difference in
complexity, rather than any domain difference,
might produce stronger recency in the social
task. The present study replicates the Christmas
task, but introduces a new non-social task
better matched in complexity, to assess domain
differences in order effects.
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Finally, as discussed above, we assess
whether children already use two serial modes,
continuous belief updating and end-of-series
belief formation. Children’s serial and final
responses have never been compared. If recency
in their judgment reflects memory, then it should
appear for updating and end-of-series judgments.
Alternatively, if order effects differ, this would fit
with a view that the two serial modes seen with
adults emerge from childhood.
Method
Participants
Eighty mostly Caucasian children participated.
The younger children (21 girls, 11 boys, mean
age 6; 2 years, range 5; 3 to 7; 11 years)
were randomly assigned to one of two tasks.
Of the older children (25 girls, 23 boys, mean
age 9; 1 years, range 8; 0 to 11; 1 years),
the first 32 were also randomly assigned to the
two tasks. The remaining 16 participated later
in the treasure task, with updating and end-
of-sequences conditions run in reverse order,
to test for practice effects. Children were an
opportunity sample, volunteers at a community-
based, central London after-school play-centre,
with middle to lower middle-class intake.
Materials
Two formally identical tasks involved the same
physical +/- stimuli, but different narratives. The
stimuli were gold star/black dot stickers, each on
a white card (10 x 5.5 cm). Each sample sequence
involved a new set of 12 cards/stickers, in 3 rows
of 4, star/dot side down. Four cards were sampled,
one at a time, apparently at random.
In S&A’s Christmas task, each card set
represented Santa’s file record for a story child’s
behaviour during the months of the year. The
card side facing the participant showed the name
of the story child. Participants sampled +/- cards
for four months to judge how good this story
child had been all year. The physical quantity
task was a card version of a treasure hunt. The
cards represented 12 streets in a city, and star/
dot represented golden treasure or old black
rock. The card side facing participants showed
different house/tree configurations. Participants
searched four streets to judge how much treasure
was hidden in the city overall.
The response scale was a 35cm dowel with
1cm segments. A 5cm gold disc marked the
all good/treasure end; a black disc marked the
all naughty/rock end. Participants pointed to a
dowel location to show how good a story child
had been last year/how much treasure was hidden
in a city. Ratings were read from the back to
the nearest cm. Children can use such scales
from 4 years (Anderson & Schlottmann, 1991).
This scale differed from S&A, where the dowel
had a slider showing the old response until it
was updated. Here, in contrast, children pointed,
typically removing their finger as each sample was
removed
Design
Each sequence has 4 +/- samples. The 4 serial
positions of these samples correspond to 4 factors,
with +/- factor levels, in a factorial design,
yielding 16 different sequences in total (see Table
1).
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Table 1
The 16 sample sequences shown to children,
corresponding to a position-1 x position-2 x
position-3 x position-4 factorial design, with +/-
levels for each factor; children in sample group
1 saw only sequences with consistent or even
composition; children in sample group 2 saw
sequences with one inconsistent sample
Each child saw 8 of the sequences; sample-
group 1 judged 2+2- and 4+ or 4- proportions,
and sample-group 2 judged 3+1- or 3-1+
proportions. Each group thus judged a complete
position-1 x position-2 x position-3 factorial.
Both groups combine to the full 4-factor
design, such that the main effect of position-4
corresponds to the 4-way interaction of the group
with the other positions. This confounding was
preferred over tiring children in a long session.
Participants judged each sequence in two
ways: Initially, they updated their judgment after
each sample. Thus, when the first update in
the sequence is the DV, sample at position-1
is the only within subjects factor, analyses of
the second update as DV includes sample at
position-1 and position-2, and so on. Sample-
group (1, 2), age (older, younger) and task (social,
physical) are additional between subjects factors
in mixed model factorial analyses.
After completing updating for all 8 sequences,
children saw them all again, this time making
only a single, end-of-series judgment for
each. These end-of-series judgments could be
influenced by the preceding updating task. To
evaluate this, an additional group of older
children made end-of-series judgments first,
serial judgments second, for the treasure task.
Procedure
Children were tested in individual, 20 to 30
minute sessions. First, a puppet (“Lucy”) invited
children to play a treasure hunt game, or needed
help figuring out, for Santa, how nice some
children had been all year long (testing was in
winter). One story child’s record was shown,
with 12 cards for 12 months. Two cards were
turned over to reveal gold/black, meaning that
the story child had been mostly nice/naughty that
month. In the treasure game, similarly, children
learned that the card set represented a city,
seeing samples of treasure/rock hidden in its
streets. A new card set, for a different story
child or city, was then chosen, the cards laid
out, and Lucy modeled sampling (apparently at
random) and judgment for an anchor sequence
(6 gold samples), starting from the scale midpoint
“because we don’t know anything about this
child/city yet”. Upon finding the first gold, Lucy
explained “Gold/good! I think there is more gold
in this city/this child has been mostly good,
because this street already has gold/the child was
good in this first month already. But we have
only one clue, so we don’t know very much about
the whole city/the rest of the year yet.” Then
Lucy explained the scale “this is how we show
how much gold we think there is/how good we
think a child has been. We point to this bar. This
end means every street has gold/the child has
been good all year long. This end means every
street has only old black rock/the child has been
naughty all year long. I think this city has more
gold, but I don’t know about most of the streets
yet,” while pointing at below ¾ of the scale. Lucy
removed the old sample, revealed a new sample,
pointed, etc, with decreasing adjustments and
comments (e.g., we found gold/the child was good
– now we know a bit more, but we still don’t know
whether the whole city has gold/the child has
always been good, because we have not looked
at many streets/months). The child aided by the
puppet then judged a second anchor sequence (6
black), then practiced judgments without model
for a 3+/3- sequence. Corrections were made
if adjustment was directionally incorrect, or the
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child pointed to the extremes on the first sample,
but rarely needed. The puppet went to sleep and
the child continued, without feedback, with the
experimental sequences.
Afterwards, children heard “you did well, so
we can make it harder. I tell you about some
more cities/children, but this time you only
make one guess at the very end, after we have
looked at several streets/months.” Children saw
all sequences again, making only one judgment
for each sequence.
Results
Four updates per sequence allow a rich set
of analyses: We begin by describing the raw
data patterns for the 16 sequences. We then
test the model for judgment at each position,
subsequently using it to decompose the judgment
and measure the weights for each evidence
sample. Next, we look at the adjustments in
judgment from one position to the next, to
assess whether children, like adults, use the
running average strategy. Finally, we compare
children’s updating responses with their end-of-
series responses for the same sequences.
Complete judgment patterns
Figure 1
Children’s mean judgments of “How much gold is
hidden in this city?”/”How nice was this child all
year?” Each diagram shows how judgments were
updated after samples 1 to 4 (horizontal) in 16
unique sequences (listed on the right of each panel)
Figure 1 shows children’s mean judgments
after each sample (horizontal) for all different
sequences seen at this position. Thus, at
position-1, there are two means, for the first
+ or – sample. At position-2, there are four
means for four sequences, as the initial +/-
sample is followed by another + or -, splitting
into 8 and 16 unique sequences at position-3
and -4, respectively (listed on the right). Each
line that can be traced on the graph shows how
children updated their judgments from the first
to the fourth sample in a sequence. The top
line, for instance, shows judgments increasing
steadily for the 4+ sequence, while the line
branching downwards at position-2 is for the +
+-- sequence.
Figure 1 shows four main results: First,
judgments reflect, as they should, size and
composition of the preceding sequence. At
the point of judgment, children saw only the
current sample, but with minor exceptions,
they responded to new positive information by
increasing, to negative information by decreasing
the unseen prior judgment. For instance, the
top and bottom lines for 4+ and 4- sequences
How Children Form and Update Beliefs from an Evidence Series*
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show more extreme judgments as sample size
grows. Sequence composition effects appear in
that judgments are typically highest for 4+
sequences, decreasing for 3+1-, 2+2-, 1+3-, and
4- sequences. This is clearer for the older children
(top panels, see labels on the right).
The second main finding is recency. Sequences
with the same composition do not elicit the same
judgments, but judgments depend on sample
ordering, with stronger effects of later samples.
To illustrate, position-2 judgments (second from
left on horizontal) for -+ sequences were higher
than for +- sequences, with the smallest F(1, 15)
= 6.23, MSE = 14.61, ηpartial 2  = 0.29 (all p <
0.05 unless noted, throughout the paper.) This
position-2 recency, in comparison of -+ and +-
sequences, is larger for younger children, with an
age x sequence interaction for both ages/tasks,
F(1, 60) = 22.21, MSE = 27.37, ηpartial 2  = 0.27.
The recency seems slightly larger in the social
task (left panel), but this was not significant, F(1,
60) = 2.63, MSE = 27.37, ηpartial 2  = 0.04, p
= 0.11. Throughout this study, task differences
were in the same direction, but smaller than in
S&A and non-significant. The absence of task
differences is our third finding.
Position-3 and -4 judgments also show recency,
i.e., judgments are typically higher when positive,
lower when negative information comes later. As
at position-2, the recency is stronger for younger
children: Strikingly, their judgments form two
distinct clusters, for sequences with + or -
final informer. Thus, non-normative order effects
are larger than normative sample composition
effects, which nevertheless appear within the
clusters. Younger children are also less affected
by sample size, with fairly extreme judgments
appearing from the first sample, especially in
the social task. These age differences, discussed
further below, are our fourth finding.
The raw judgment patterns in Figure 1 are
complex because they include children’s reaction
to sequence content and order. If the additive
model of Equation 1 holds, however, we can
simplify and separate these effects. The first step
was to test the additive model, which predicted
no interactions between serial positions: Indeed,
while both ages showed main effects of all
samples on judgments at all positions, only
2 of the 64 interactions between them were
significant (see Appendix). Thus the model held,
replicating S&A.
Serial position weights
The model was then used to decompose the
judgments and derive the weight of each serial
position (Figure 2, see Appendix for details of
how weights were computed). The R4 curve
gives the weights for 4 samples on judgment at
position-4. The R3 curve gives the weights for 3
samples on judgment at position-3, and so on. In
each curve, the highest weight is for the current
sample. This is the recency from Figure 1, shown
more clearly. These recency weights are slightly
higher in the social task, and much higher for
younger children.
The novel feature of Figure 2 is that it
traces the temporal development of the recency,
highlighting that this is largely short-term.
Compare, for instance, the position-3 weight in
the R3 and R4 curves. In the R3 curve, the
position-3 sample is the current informer, and
the weight is high, reflecting strong recency. In
the R4 curve, however, when the next sample
appears, the position-3 weight does not remain
elevated, but comes right down. The upswing
of the terminal position weight is temporary in
all curves. Once it disappears, the weight curves
are flat, with informers having similar weights on
judgment, for both tasks/ages.
Anne Schlottmann.
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Figure 2
Serial weight curves. The R4 curve shows weights
for 4 informers (horizontal) on the response at
position 4, the other curves do the same for earlier
responses. These weights are the difference between
the effect of + and – informers at a given position
(see Appendix for further explanation). The
upswing of the curves at the final position, with
flat curves at earlier positions, indicates short-term
recency.
These flat curves are a key point: If the
terminal recency at R3 (or R2 or R1) was
incorporated into the attitude visible at the
next response R4 (or R3 or R2), then these
curves would continue to slope over the non-
terminal positions, with ever-decreasing weights
for earlier informers. That the curves are flat,
in contrast, implies that the recency dissipates
before the next belief adjustment. Thus there
are two components to the attitude, a short-
term component with strong recency, and a stable
long-term component without it.
Both ages show this two-component structure,
with one clear age difference: The flat weights of
non-terminal informers in Figure 2 are twice as
large for older children. While a stable attitude
develops for all, this is weaker for younger
children.
These observations were confirmed by
statistical comparison of the 4 terminal recency
weights (rightmost points of each curve) and,
separately, of the 6 other, non-terminal weights
(the permanent attitude component), with age/
task as additional IVs. There were no task
differences, but main effects of age appeared in
both analyses, F(1, 60) ≥ 20.8, MSE = 108.24,
ηpartial 2  = 0.26, with stronger recency and a
weaker permanent attitude at the younger age.
The terminal recency weights increased from
R1 to R4 (upward trend in top points), F(3,
180) = 42.9, MSE = 6.42, ηpartial 2  = 0.42,
more so for younger children, F(3, 180) = 2.77,
MSE = 6.42, ηpartial 2  = 0.04. Notably, the
much smaller differences between non-terminal
weights (flat parts of the curves) were significant
as well, F(5, 300) = 3.02, MSE = 5.22,
ηpartial 2  = 0.05, with initial position-1 weights
for R3 and R4 sequences 0.5 lower than the
others. A small amount of recency was therefore
incorporated into the permanent attitude and did
not dissipate. This did not differ between tasks/
ages.
In sum, the serial weight analysis showed
that the extreme recency in children’s updating
responses was largely short-term, obscuring, not
precluding a permanent attitude. These analyses
were possible because children’s data fit the
general additive model of Equation 1.
Continuous belief updating
The next question is whether children, like
adults, use the more specific running average
model of Equation 3 to update beliefs.
Continuous updating was not built into the
procedure, but two aspects of the data argue that
children used this.
First, there were serendipitous behavioural
indications of belief adjustment. Thirteen
younger children (41%, mean age 6 years 4
months) and 21 older children (66%, mean
9 years 1 month) used a finger as a sliding
marker at least once, keeping it on the
scale when an informer was removed and
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adjusting position after the next informer. This
typically appeared for some samples in some
sequences, not consistently for all/most trials.
When children with/without finger-sliding were
compared statistically, finger-sliding children had
smaller recency for judgment at all positions,
with F(1, 62) ≥ 8.64, MSE = 86.23, ηpartial 2
= 0.12.Finger-sliding children thus gave more
mature judgments.
Secondly, adjustments from one sample to
the next showed consistency effects, with more
adjustment to the same sample if it was less
consistent with the prior sequence. This is a
major prediction of the belief adjustment model
of Equation 3, as discussed in the introduction.
Accordingly, there should be more adjustment
at position 2 to samples inconsistent with
the preceding sample (+- or -+) than to
consistent samples (-- or ++), with equivalent
predictions for longer sequences, e.g., the same
position-4 sample should elicit more adjustment
if inconsistent with all 3 prior samples than only
2, just one, or none.
Figure 3 plots absolute size of adjustments from
a response to the next, in the order predicted
by the model. Darker bars, for more discrepant
samples, should show more adjustment than
lighter bars for less discrepant samples. In the top
and middle panels, position-2 and -3 adjustments
grow to the right, as predicted, for both ages/
tasks. At the bottom, for position-4, ordering
is as predicted at age 6, with two inversions
at age 9. Recall, however, that two groups of
children saw different sequences at position-4,
and inverted effects appeared between groups,
while the predictions held within groups. The
inversions could thus reflect group differences,
not model deviations. This requires further work.
For now, both the finger-pointing data and
consistency effects support the belief updating
model.
Figure 3
Size of adjustment to samples at position 2 to 4 (top
to bottom) for two ages and tasks. The running
adjustment model predicts increasing adjustment
from left to right in each block, as inconsistency
with prior samples increases (darker bars are less
consistent)
End-of-Series judgments
Our final question was whether children, like
adults, already use two modes of serial judgment.
Thus, after the updating task, children saw
all sequences again, giving one end-of-series
judgment per sequence, to see whether order
effects take the same form as for updating. The
additive model also fit these final responses,
with main effects of all 4 informers, F(1, 56)
≥ 143.77, MSE = 41.08, ηpartial 2  = 0.12,
but no interactions (only 4 F > 1). Figure 4
compares the weights for final (black curves)
and serial responding (halftone, these are the
R4 updating weights from Figure 2). The curves
clearly differ: Final responding produces less
recency and higher non-terminal weights, for
both ages/tasks.
The largely flat weight curves for final
responding showed hints of a u-shape, i.e.,
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primacy and recency, but the position effect
was not significant, F(3, 180) = 2.48, MSE =
18.34, ηpartial 2  = 0.04, p = 0.062. That weights
were lower for younger children was also not
significant, F(1, 60) = 2.47, MSE = 38.2, ηpartial
2  = 0.04, p = 0.12; there were no other effects
either.
Statistical comparison of serial and final
weights confirmed the difference between the
curves in Figure 4, with a position x response
mode interaction, F(3, 180) = 47.56, MSE =
19.68, ηpartial 2  = 0.44, that differed with age,
F(3, 180) = 6.02, MSE = 19.68, ηpartial 2  = 0.09,
due to the previously discussed age differences
in serial responses. This underscores that order
effects differ between serial and final judgments.
(The contributing response mode and position
main effects, plus the age x position interaction
also reached significance. The only other effect
was a task x position interaction, with a less
regular pattern in the treasure task when weights
combined over response mode. This is the only
significant task difference in any of the analyses
in this paper).
Figure 4
Serial weight curves for responses after all 4
samples, for serial updating (half-tone, repeated
from Figure 2) and for end-of-series responses.
Updating came first.
The curve differences in Figure 4 could reflect
two serial modes — or practice effects, because
after extensive experience, children may have
switched to a more normative approach late in
the session. Another group of older children thus
gave end-of-series responses first. Serial weight
curves (Figure 5) were similar to those in Figures
2 and 4, for the same age/task and opposite order
of response modes, and did not differ statistically
(F(3, 90) < 1.68, MSE = 8.39, ηpartial 2  = 0.05,
p = 0.176). The curve differences thus reflect
effects of response mode per se.
Model fit for updating responses was good in
this new group of children, with only one of 16
interactions between positions, F(1, 14) = 5.49,
MSE = 13.12, ηpartial 2  = 0.28. However, the
model did not fit their final responses well, with 3
of 6 significant interactions; the smallest had F(1,
14) = 5.24, MSE = 9.78, ηpartial 2  = 0.27. The
model may not hold in this case.
Figure 5
Serial weights for a new group of 9-year-olds in
the physical treasure task, responding after each
sample (left) or giving an end-of-series response
(right). End-of-series judgments came first in this
group of children, but this did not affect the weights
(compare with Figures 2 and 4).
Regardless of this, final responding eliminated
the recency in all groups of children. All in all, the
data suggest therefore that children, like adults,
use two different approaches for judgment from
serial information.
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Discussion
Much real-world information unfolds over time,
but how children cope is rarely studied. The
introduction raised four questions about their
serial processing. Results show, first, that children
can make systematic serial judgments even
if this involves multiple updates of purely
mentally represented prior beliefs. Second, there
is developmental continuity in the serial process,
but change in its serial weight parameters.
Thirdly, no differences appeared between social
and non-social judgment domains. Finally,
children, like adults, respond differently when
continuously updating beliefs or giving only one
judgment at the end of the series. These findings
are discussed in turn.
Children can update mentally represented beliefs
Children from early school age systematically
updated mental representations, without an
external representation of the prior belief to
aid them. This adds to prior findings of simpler
updating abilities from the toddler age (Ganea
et al., 2007). Here, children repeatedly updated
representations of a quantitative, non-perceptual
property (niceness or amount of treasure), in a
way that reflected changes in sample proportion
and size over time.
Our results agree with a recent study in which
5-year-olds updated their trust in an informant’s
claim from extended observation of behaviour
(Ronfard & Lane, 2018). Children guessed, over
4 trials, the location of a sticker under cup A
or B, based on what an informant told another
agent; this informant was inaccurate on one of
4 trials. In a video, on trial 1, the informant
looked under each cup and told the other agent
where the sticker was, then the video stopped to
allow the child to guess the location. When the
video started again, the other agent looked under
the cup designated by the informant (which
reveals accuracy if integrated with the earlier
verbal statement), the informant apologized for
the error (in some conditions), and finally the
child judged the informant’s niceness, smartness
and intention (on some trials). Trial 2 followed
immediately and a new sticker was hidden. The
informant again looked, said were it was, the
child guessed again, etc. The child’s guess on
trial 2 thus potentially reflects trustworthiness
as inferred from trial 1, and so on, for later
trials. Despite multiple steps between accuracy
information and judgment, children chose the
location designated by the informant more often
when the informant was more accurate over
preceding trials. This extends S&A and the
present finding, that children’s judgment reflects
sample proportion, to another domain and to
information of greater interpretative complexity.
In Ronfard and Lane’s (2018) work, children
saw complex behaviour, but each child judged
only one sequence, so the data give limited
information on process. The present data are
complementary, with children judging multiple,
simpler sequences, which allows process analysis.
This suggests that children use a running average
updating approach, like adults.
In evidence, first, children spontaneously
finger-marked the prior opinion. This indicates
running adjustment, but not its mathematical
form, which was determined from formal model
tests. These upheld the additive model of
Equation 1. Consistency effects constrained
the model qualitatively to its running average
form, with larger belief revisions for inconsistent
evidence, as for adults. All ages may thus use a
similar belief adjustment process.
Finger-marking is not needed for belief
adjustment, of course, but children are unlikely
to use it without a compatible internal approach,
so our index is conservative. Self-generated use
of an external marker may reduce processing load
and, indeed, finger-marking children showed less
recency. It is, of course, unclear whether finger-
marking allows better weighting of prior opinion/
evidence, or whether some children – more
able ones perhaps – discover external marking
and show less recency. Other children may use
belief adjustment internally or – halfway between
internal/external – could visually fixate prior
scale location. Either way, overt signs of running
adjustment in almost half of the younger children
are impressive given low levels of strategy use at
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this age (Bjorklund, 1990). High levels of serial
strategy from early on fit with a view that serial
processing is frequent in everyday life.
Development of serial strategies may resemble
that of memory strategies (Bjorklund, 1990):
These first appear in contexts triggering them
automatically, with deliberate control over
use achieved later. The same may hold for
judgment. Continuous updating may emerge in
online reactions to rapidly unfolding perceptual
sequences, during narratives or episodes of
observation/interaction. While the prior belief
is mentally represented, crucially, it remains
activated from one informer to the next one
and does not need to be recalled each time.
The familiar Christmas/treasure contexts, with
informers in quick succession, may fit this
description.
Adults also use running adjustment in
deliberate, controlled ways, even when prior
beliefs must repeatedly be retrieved from
memory, with distractor tasks (Dreben et al.,
1979). Ronfard and Lane’s (2018) finding that
children tracked trustworthiness over a sequence
with multiple interpolated (albeit related, not
distracting) steps suggests that children may
already have such ability. This requires further
work.
While continuous belief adjustment as
a running average is efficient, with
recursive integration minimizing memory/
processing demands at each step, it may
contribute to the recency effects so often
found for adults, as for children here.
Running adjustment can produce normative
responses, but only if current sample and
prior belief are weighted proportionally to
sample size; the current sample weight must
decrease as the sequence grows, because
the sample already condensed in the prior
belief has increased. Recency appears if this
weight reduction is insufficient, e.g., if current
evidence is given equal weight throughout. But
running adjustment produces only a summary
representation at each step; sample size must
be tracked separately. Young children may not
do this, or not do it well. The ubiquity of
recency effects in adult belief updating suggests
this remains difficult later.
Developmental aspects
Despite children using the same updating process
as adults, we also found developmental changes:
Older children showed less short-term recency
and stronger long-term beliefs.
Our finding of major recency at age 6 does
not contradict the absence of recency for similar-
aged children in Ronfard and Lane (2018).
Recency, found here, and elsewhere for adults,
is typically short-term and dissipates by the next
sample. Ronfard and Lane did not measure
children’s trust right after the informant’s
(un)trustworthiness became clear, but only
after several interpolated events, including the
informant’s next statement. Therefore, one
would not expect much recency in their data, and
the two studies fit well.
The recency in the present study reduced
substantially from age 6 to 9. One may wonder,
however, about older or younger ages. By
standardizing weights (to % of scale range)
different ages can be compared across published
studies with similar procedure 1  . This shows far
stronger recency here than in S&A with younger
children. The recency weight for 6-year-olds here
was 50% of scale range, reducing to 30% by age
9, similar to 5-year-olds in S&A. The extreme
recency here likely reflects increased processing
load without external marker.
To estimate development past age 9, two
sets of adult studies, with materials of different
complexity, are relevant. If tested on the present
task, adults would likely focus exclusively on the
visual black/gold feature, ignoring the childish
Christmas/treasure narratives. They may then
simply estimate colour frequency, as in Shanteau
(1970, 1972), who found only minor recency.
This comparison suggests a large reduction in
recency beyond age 9.
Identical tasks do not guarantee identical
processing, however, and arguably, children did
not treat the stars as un-interpreted visual
features, but as cues to hidden treasure/past
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deeds. In this case, appropriate comparison is
to studies of attitude formation from verbal
descriptions (Anderson & Farkas, 1973; Dreben
et al., 1979). In these, recency weights for
adults were 20% to 30%, similar to older
children here. From this perspective, 9-year-
olds’ processing approximates a mature level for
semantically interpreted attitude informers. Both
comparisons are relevant, with informational
complexity mediating serial processing.
In addition to the recency component, we
can compare long-term belief strength across
the age range. This is generally more similar
in children and adults. Six- and 9-year-olds
here had long-term weights of about 7% and
14% of scale range, falling within the adult
range (7% to 15%; Anderson & Farkas, 1973;
Dreben et al., 1979; Shanteau, 1970, 1972). With
slider support, children reached adult levels even
earlier, with 11% and 14% for 5 and 6/7-year-olds
(Schlottmann & Anderson, 1995). Stable belief
weights did increase with age, but these changes
were small relative to changes in the recency
component.
The introduction considered that order
effects, like other biases, may have heuristic
value and one may further speculate about
the value of age-related change in this. In
particular, children are learners, whereas adults
have become knowers: The same world, due to
lack of experience, is less redundant for children.
While it can be efficient for knowledgeable adults
to fixate beliefs early, children may typically do
better to leave beliefs open to later revision, when
they have learnt more about the situation. More
recency in children is not just a stronger non-
normative bias, but could be adaptive, facilitating
children’s role as learners.
Adjustment for Growing Sample Size
One aspect of our results does not fit this story:
As mentioned, if the prior opinion involves
more and more evidence, then new informers
normatively carry less and less weight. This
appeared in all adult studies, but for children,
here and in S&A, the recency increased with
sequence length.
Children thus may not understand all
implications of sample size, despite some
sensitivity (Jacobs & Narloch, 2001; Lawson
& Fisher, 2011; Lawson, 2014), including our
and Ronfard and Lane’s (2018) finding of
more extreme judgments for longer series. As
previously discussed, children may find tracking
sample size difficult, but if they ignored this factor,
constant, not increasing recency would ensue.
Perhaps children focus on the wrong aspect of
uncertainty, taking a growing sample not just to
increase statistical certainty, but also to increase
task difficulty and subjective uncertainty (Bayless
& Schlottmann, 2010). This requires further
work.
Different judgment domains: Social and non-social
This study found no support for a view that
biases may be stronger in social judgment which
may be harder to quantify (Jacobs & Potenza,
1991). Slightly more recency appeared in the
social than physical task, but in contrast to S&A,
domain differences were not significant. S&A’s
non-social task involved judging uninterpreted
colour proportion per se, but in their social task
colour illustrated behaviour, which is arguably
more complex. Here, colour illustrated behaviour
or treasure and children could imagine examples
of both. If prior task differences in recency reflect
differences in information complexity, then we
found little here because complexity matched
better across tasks.
Domain differences cannot be ruled out
entirely. The social task concerned personality
traits, and while pre-schoolers occasionally
appreciate their dispositional nature (Cain et al.,
1997; Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007), traits may
seem more changeable than physical features,
with recent information more relevant to labile
traits than constant non-social properties. The
lack of domain differences here could reflect
high processing load, with ceiling level recency
suppressing domain differences. Both possibilities
remain open.
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Two strategies for serial processing in children
A final, crucial result was the contrast of
strong recency in serially updated beliefs with
no recency when beliefs were expressed only at
the end. This difference replicates findings with
adults. However, not only is recency eliminated,
but classic work shows primacy effects in adults’
final responses (e.g., Asch, 1946; Anderson,
1981; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Is this a
developmental difference?
For adults, primacy reflects attention
decrement across positions (Anderson, 1981;
Dreben et al., 1979; Riskey, 1979).
Manipulations to reduce this eliminate primacy
as well, e.g., none appears with final responding,
if adults verbalise, not just read, informers.
Children here often spontaneously verbalised
that the story child had been good/that there was
treasure etc., which would eliminate attention
decrement. Moreover, the present sequences
were short, within children’s memory limits,
while adult studies typically have 6 to 9 informer
sequences. These procedural elements rather
than development could explain the absence of
primacy here. The childhood origins of primacy
effects in impression formation have never been
studied. This needs further work urgently.
Besides eliminating short-term recency, final
responding also affected the stable beliefs:
It produced higher weights, with weights
for 6-year-olds higher than for 9-year-olds’
updating responses (Figure 4). That end-of-series
responding produced even evidence weighting
and stronger beliefs would seem a practical
advantage in work with children. It remains to
be seen whether this advantage generalizes to
longer, more demanding sequences.
The difference between serial and final
responding has implications for children’s
strategy. Serial responding clearly involves online
updating. With final responding, children could
update implicitly, or use a memory-based
approach. While many (Anderson, 1981; Bizer
et al., 2006; Busemeyer, 1991; Hastie & Park,
1986; Uleman et al., 2008) argue that memory-
based strategies are rare in familiar, predictable
judgments, the exception is for simple materials
that do not tax memory (Hogarth & Einhorn,
1992). Children clearly had no memory problem
here, order and age effects differed, and no child
used finger-marking with final responding, so
we submit that children used a memory-based
approach, aggregating informers only at the end.
Two modes of serial judgment thus may appear
from childhood.
Two objections to this position are
conceivable. Under a Piagetian view, the
memory-based strategy is beyond young children,
who cannot cope with more than one
informer at a time. However, even pre-schoolers
can integrate multiple simultaneous informers
(Ebersbach, 2009; Schlottmann, 2001). Another
argument against a memory-based strategy is
that one does not generally know whether
another informer is imminent. Children here
knew, however, from the prior updating trials,
how long the series would be, so “holding off”
judgment was viable. Moreover, teachers often
admonish children to wait with an answer until
all facts are in, perhaps focusing school-aged
children on memory-based strategies. Processing
capacities and executive functions will limit this
for children even more than for adults, but our
results tentatively suggest that 6-year-olds can
form an intention to inhibit judgment and act on
this, with benefits for the belief acquired. Further
work to delineate the conditions under which
children defer belief updating is clearly possible
and desirable.
Conclusions
Here, children revised judgments of continuous
population properties from serial sample
evidence. Such inferences are ubiquitous in social
cognition (Dozier, 1991; Boseovski & Lee, 2006;
Cain et al., 1997; Master, Markman, & Dweck,
2012), and appear in non-social domains.
Even infants draw inferences from sample to
population proportion (Xu & García, 2008). But
serial information also affects tasks with different
structure, e.g., how children evaluate binary
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hypotheses in scientific/causal reasoning (Kalish,
2012) or generalize information (Lawson, 2014).
The present study found strong recency, but
this did not determine judgments, it merely
overlaid them temporarily. Children effectively
built up beliefs reflecting sample size and
proportion, when updating beliefs and when
deferring judgment to the end. The practical
implication of this and of Ronfard and Lane
(2018) is that serial processing needs not to be
avoided with children.
The developmental role of recency highlighted
here is only one piece of the puzzle of serial
processing. Judgment of complex informers, of
longer sequences, of situations with strong
(rather than neutral) prior beliefs, as well as the
developmental emergence of primacy, and the
functional role of primacy/recency in different
environments should be studied next.
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Statistical Appendix
Model Tests
Mixed model ANOVAs were done on
judgments at each position, with age, task and
sample group as between subjects factors. The
position-1 judgments had only the first informer
as within subjects factor, position-2 judgments
had first and second informers, and so on.
Because informers at all positions were identical,
equal-sized main effects of all informers on
judgment at position-n indicate no order effects,
while a larger effect of informer n indicates
recency. If earlier informers not only have smaller
main effects than later informers, but lack main
effects entirely, then the recency has wiped out
the contributions of early informers.
The additive model of Equation 1 can be
tested because the present factorial design (see
Table 1) maps directly onto the ANOVA model
and any ANOVA interactions of the serial
positions factors mark deviations from additivity.
Accordingly, if the serial integration model holds,
samples at different positions that contribute
to judgment at this position should have main
effects, while there should be no interactions
of these serial informers on judgments at any
position.
Results supported the model. ANOVA on
position-1 judgments finds only a position-1 main
effect, larger in younger children, F(1, 56) >
10.9, MSE = 14.5, ηpartial 2  = 0.16 (all results,
throughout, are reported at p < 0.05). Analysis
of position-2 judgments finds effects of both
samples and interactions with age, reflecting a
larger position-2 effect, smaller position-1 effect
for younger children, F(1, 56) > 9.65, MSE =
12.6, ηpartial 2  = 0.15, plus a task main effect
of little concern, F(1, 56) = 4.13, MSE = 4.57,
ηpartial 2  = 0.07, due to 0.5 higher judgments in
the treasure task. The complete ANOVA model
for the position-1 x position-2 x age x task x
sample group design includes 8 effects involving
interactions of positions-1 and 2. These could
falsify the model, but only one was significant, age
x sample group x position-1 x position-2, F(1, 56)
= 4.69, MSE = 3.91, ηpartial 2  = 0.08, without
clear pattern.
At position-3, again significant main effects of
all 3 serial factors appeared, all differing between
the ages, F(1, 56) > 13.2, MSE = 19.06, ηpartial
2  = 0.19, with position-1 and -2 effects smaller,
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position-3 effect larger for younger children.
Task differences were absent, except for a task
x sample group x position-3 interaction (the
position-3 effect was about 4 points smaller in the
treasure task for the group that would later see
2:2/4:0 sequences at position-4, F(1, 56) = 6.34,
MSE = 56.68, ηpartial 2  = 0.1). More importantly,
there were a total of thirty-two interaction effects
involving 2- or 3-way interactions of at least two
serial positions that could falsify the model, but
all of these were non-significant. Only 5 had F >
1.
The same pattern of results also appeared for
judgment at position-4: There were main effects
of all 4 factors, each qualified by an interaction
with age, F(1, 56) > 11.76, MSE = 17.43, ηpartial
2  = 0.17, with the position-4 effect larger, the
other effects smaller at the younger age. Only
one effect involving an interaction of at least
two serial positions appeared, task x age x sample
group x position-3 x position-4, F(1, 56) = 6.03,
MSE = 8.5, p = 0.017, ηpartial 2  = 0.09, with
no clear pattern. Of course, information on high
order interactions at this position is missing (as
each child only judged half of the design, see
method). Overall, only 2 of 64 interaction tests
across judgment at all positions were significant.
Thus there was good model support in children’s
serial updating responses.
Follow-up Tests for Individual Ages
Because the main effects of the 4 serial
positions generally differed by age, it is possible
that for the younger children informers at earlier
serial positions made no significant contribution
to judgment at the later positions. However,
when the younger children’s data were analysed
separately, effects of all serial informers on
judgment at all 4 positions still appeared, F(1, 28)
> 8.15, MSE = 11.36, ηpartial 2  = 0.23. Across
judgment at all positions, only one interaction of
the serial positions reached significance, F(1, 28)
= 7.08, MSE = 4.59, ηpartial 2  = 0.2. Thus, even
the younger children considered all informers,
with judgments described by the serial model.
Serial Weight Curves. Because the serial
integration model held, it could be used to
decompose the judgments and derive the serial
weights. The difference in marginal means for +
and – samples at position n (in other words, the
ANOVA unstandardized main effect of informer
n) reflects both sample weight and value in
Equation 1. But since identical stimuli were used
at all serial positions, the difference between the
values of the + and – sample is constant. This
makes the serial position weights in Equation 1
proportional to the ANOVA serial position main
effects.
For instance, for R4 responses, after the fourth
informer, 9-year-olds in the physical task gave
mean judgments of 23.72 to sequences with +
and of 12.52 to sequences with - as fourth and
final informer, which gives a weight of 11.2. For
sequences with + and – informers at position-3,
in contrast, they gave R4 judgments of 20.81 and
15.42, yielding a much lower weight of 5.61. For
sequences with + and – as position-2 and -1
informers, the weights came to 5.33 and 4.39,
respectively, declining only slightly from position
3 to 1. These values yield the R4 curve in Figure
2, showing recency, with a much higher weight
for the final informer.
The same calculations were also done to derive
the weights of informers contributing to the
earlier R3, R2 and R1 responses, yielding the
family of curves in the top left panel of Figure 2.
The same calculations were also done for the final
responses in Figures 4 and 5, but, of course, with
only one response we can derive only one curve.
Notes
1 I thank J. Shanteau for this suggestion.
*      Research article.
